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IN SUMMATION

Planned constitution never got written,
but Israel still got constitutional law
By Marcia Gelpe

I

SRAEL IS A

young democracy.
Despite the
pressures of the
IIII migration of tens of thousands of refugees from other countries, repeated wars,
IIIllI economic uncertainty, Israel has maintllined a stable democratic society since her
t'stablishment as a modem state in 1948.
She has done it without a written constitutit)n - but not without the development of
11 su bstantial body of constitutional law that
is politically and legally important.
Israel is a parliamentary democracy. At
lilly given time, about eight active parties
ohtain substantial shares of the vote, and
(,;I(;h gets proportional representation in
1he parliament.
Israel's legislative branch, the Knesset,
h:ls 120 members. Most bills are enacted by
Illajority vote, with no minimum quorum.
As in Great Britain, statutes enacted by the
p:lrliament are technically the highest law
or the land.
The executive branch is headed by the
prime minister, who - until now - has
hl'l'n chosen from among the members of
the Knesset. Starting with the next elect i( lIlS, the prime minister will be chosen by
direct vote of the electorate. The prime
III inisteris always the head of one ofthe two
1:lrgest parties, depending on which one is
; I hlc to gamer a majority of Knesset votes
hy forming a coalition with other parties.
·I·hc prime minister forms the Government,
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which includes heads of the ministries. The
ministers have a more political role than the
secretaries who head departments in the
United States. The ministers participate in
the Government, a creature of the parliamentary system that has no precise parallel in the U.S. system.
The president is appointed by the
Knesset for a five-year term. The presidency is largely ceremonial, although the
president may hold considerable influence
over the conscience of the people - by personal stature as much as the office,
Israel has a full system of trial and appellate courts. The highest court is the
Supreme Court, which sits on all types of
cases. Most important, sitting as the High
Court of Justice, it reviews actions of administrative authorities, to see that they are
consistent with statutes and - more
broadly -with the "rule of law," the concept that the government is subject to
structured principles in her actions. Administrative authority is defined broadly
and even includes committees of the
Knesset. Justices of the Supreme Court
are appointed by a committee on which sitting judges and members of the bar hold
the majority of seats, largely freeing the
selection process from strong political
influence.
In democratic nations, constitutions generally fill two purposes: They set out the
structure and powers of government, and
they declare the individual rights that are
to be protected from government interference. In other words, they grant and limit
government power. Constitutions are
supra-legal documents. They are the highest law of the land, subject to change only
by extraordinary means.
Most of the main body of the U.S.
Constitution, for example, is devoted to
setting out the structure and powers of the
federal government. The first ten amendments are devoted mainly to setting out
individual rights, in theform oflimitations
on federal power.
Although Israel lacks a written constitution, it has a body of law that defines the

structure and powers of the government,
declares individual rights, and is subject to
change only by extraordinary means.
The founders of the State of Israel
planned to have a written constitution, but
none was ever adopted.
That was, and is, attributable in part to
the continuous state of war. Within 24
hours of its establishment in 1948, Israel
was invaded by all her neighbors Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt - plus
Iraq. There was no time for the newly
forming government to debate and draft a
constitution. Needing a legal regime, a law
was enacted declaring that law existing at
the time would remain the law of the land,
to the extent it was not inconsistent with
the Declaration of the Establishment of the
State of Israel, and subject to change by
later acts of the parliament.
GYPT AND, recently, Jordan have signed
peace treaties with Israel, but otherwise
the state of war and persistent internal
threats to Israel's security have continued,
making it difficult to develop a written constitution. Democracies face extraordinary
constitutional problems in times of war.
Evidence of that is found in our own World
War I-era cases on freedom of speech,
which defined that freedom restrictively.
To develop an entire constitution in such
times is an even more daunting task.
Compounding the challenge of writing
a constitution is an unresolved debate on
the religious nature of the Israeli state. Israel was established to be the homeland for
the Jewish people. Most Israelis agree that
it is essential to maintain the Jewish nature
of the state - but whether and to what extent the state should define and enforce
Jewish religious norms is a subject of vigorous debate. The lack of agreement on this
important matter hinders the enactment of
a written constitution, which would be
expected to address the issue. Much of
this debate seems inscrutable to many in
the West. Unlike most Western religions,
Middle Eastern religions, including
Judaism and Islam, intertwine religion
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with what we in the United States call
nationality and law.
Finally, Israel's political structure has
made constitutional enactment difficult.
Because Israel's parliamentary system has
many actively participating parties, and
because minority parties playa crucial
swing role in her coalition governments, it
has been difficult to enact a constitutional
document, which by its nature must reflect
majority consensus more than minority
demands.
Despite those problems, the Israelis have
felt the need for law of a constitutional
nature. In 1950, the Knesset declared its
intention to develop a constitution piecemeal, by enacting a series of "Basic Laws."
In addition, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the need for preserving the
rule of law and for protecting the rights of
individuals from undue intrusion by the
government. The public seems supportive
of these attitudes.
Without a written constitution, Israel
has developed constitutional doctrine
through two methods: enactment of Basic
Laws by the Knesset and pronouncement
of constitutional doctrine by the Supreme
Court.
The Knesset has enacted eleven Basic
Laws. Six deal directly with the structure
of the state (Knesset, President of the State,
the Government, Armed Forces, Judiciary,
and State Comptroller); two with individual rights (Freedom of Occupation, and
Human Dignity and Freedom), and three
with other matters (Israel's Land, State
Economy, and Jerusalem as Israel's Capital). Many of these laws, or their essential
provisions, are" entrenched," which means
they cannot be altered except by a majority of the members of the Knesset.
This is an extraordinary requirement, for
two reasons. First, the Government usually
constitutes only a slim majority of all
Knesset members, so any vote that requires
an absolute majority is really a vote of confidence in the Government. Second, because no quorum is required for most
Knesset action, most laws can be and are
passed by a majority of the small fraction
of the Knesset's members who actually vote
on a particular matter.
The idea that the Knesset can bind itself
not to change future laws except through
an extraordinary procedure is one difficulty. In the United States, for example, a
legislature can always change an earlier law
by a later one. Moreover, the Israeli
24
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Supreme Court has taken upon itself the
task of declaring invalid later laws which
contradict entrenched provisions in earlier
Basic Laws. That, too, is odd in a system in
which the parliament is conceived of as
supreme and not subject to constitutional
review in a court.
The constitutional nature of the Basic
Laws, at least their entrenched provisions,
is evidenced by two features. First, at least
eight of them deal with the usual topics of
a constitution: the structure and powers of
government and the protection of individual rights. Second, they can be altered
only by extraordinary means. This second
feature is recognized by the Knesset and
also by the Supreme Court, even though it
presents some theoretical difficulties.
THER constitutional doctrine, not
anchored in the Basic Laws, is found
in the case law developed by the Supreme
Court. This law appears mainly in the context of Supreme Court opinions interpreting statutes and in cases determining the
validity of administrative action. The court
has been aggressive in interpreting legislation and administrative authority through
rulings that establish principles of governmental structure, on the one hand, and
recognize individual freedoms, on the
other. For example, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly exerted its power to consider the
validity of administrative action asserted
to be nonjusticiable based on its recognition of the importance of the doctrines of
separation of powers and checks and balances, and its own role in preserving these
doctrines.
On the side of recognizing individual
freedoms, the Supreme Court has been
even more aggressive. It has recognized, at
a minimum, the freedoms of speech, assembly, religious practice, and occupation
(even before this was recognized in a
Basic Law); freedom from religious coercion and from discrimination on the basis
of nationality or gender; and the right not
to be deprived of property without just
compensation.
When the court recognizes one of these
freedoms, it interprets legislation or administrative authority in a ways consistent
with those freedoms. In other words, it
presumes that it was not the legislative intent to enact a law or authorize administrative action that would infringe on such a
freedom. The presumption, almost
irrebuttable, sometimes is used to justify an
otherwise quite surprising interpretation of
a statute.

O

The court finds the constitutional principles which it recognizes in a number of
places: the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, the democratic
nature of the state, the general themes
evidenced in her statutes, the concept of
natural justice, and the concept of the rule
of law. Some might say that the principles
are also based on the ideas of the justices
themselves.
What justifies the court behaving in this
way? One justification is the Foundations
of Law Statute (1980), which says that if
the court cannot resolve a case before it on
the basis of statute, case law, or by analogy,
it should resolve the case in "in light of the
principles of freedom, justice, equity and
peace ofIsrael's heritage." Another justification is akin to that offered by Justice
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison: In a democracy, some institution has to watch the
government, and the court is the institution
to do it. Others might argue that the best
justification is the fact that the Israeli
Supreme Court is the most respected institution of Israeli government - and maintains that respect by protecting important
principles. Still others might claim that the
only justification is the court's bald assertion of power.
In any case, this is how the court in fact
works and establishes constitutional doctrine. The basic characteristics of constitutional doctrine are present. The rulings deal
with constitutional subject matter: the
structure and power of government and
the protection of individual rights. The rulings can be changed only by extraordinary
means. Although in theory these
court-developed rules can be overturned at
any time by the Knesset through ordinary
legislation, in fact they cannot be so easily
altered. The court's own aggressive protection of the such principles in its readings
of statutes limits the Knesset's ability to alter them by any but the most explicit means.
Moreover, the prestige of the court functionally dissuades the Knesset from overturning the principles without extraordinary political debate and even
upheaval.
Israel's development of constitutional
law without a written constitution presents
a fascinating picture of how a system,
unable to develop a constitution in the
usual manner, has developed one in another manner. It shows how innovative
lawmaking'can be - and sometimes must
be - to maintain a democratic political
Ii]
system.

